The aim of this module is to investigate and understand the central questions of metaethics.

In Metaethics we study the philosophical issues that lie behind or are presupposed by normative ethics (which is that part of ethics covered by the second year module, Contemporary Ethical Theory). For example, when someone says ‘stealing is wrong’ they are making a normative ethical claim, but when they follow it up by saying ‘but that is just my opinion, I wouldn’t want to impose it on anyone else’ they have shifted to taking a position in metaethics, a position that morality is merely a matter of opinion rather than a matter of fact. And of course, we can wonder whether that is right. The second year module on moral philosophy spent some time on deontology versus consequentialism, and behind that debate lies another metaethical question: whether moral requirements are requirements of rationality, requirements that any rational agent is committed to simply in virtue of being a rational agent or whether they depend instead on our preferences or attitudes.

More broadly, metaethics is concerned with the questions of what is it for something to be good or bad, right or wrong, what ought or ought not to be done; whether moral properties are objective features of the world, and if so, whether they are natural or non-natural features, or whether they depend on the attitudes or responses or rational willing of subjects; whether moral discourse is truth apt or whether its semantics must be given in other terms; whether moral judgements are cognitive or non-cognitive states and whether they are necessarily motivating.

• demonstrate knowledge and critical understanding of the doctrines and arguments of current analytical philosophers on metaethics.

The module will be delivered through lectures and seminars. Seminars will take the form of discussion sessions led by a member of staff or discussion sessions where students work independently in small groups.

This module will be taught using printed books and also using journal articles which are available online (e.g. via Learning Central) or from the library.

Timetabled sessions will be supplemented with written material in the form of a detailed summary of the session content, questions and/or instructions for discussion and a list of further reading. This supplementary material will be provided on Learning Central and will be projected during the sessions using PowerPoint. Any supplementary material in a permanent form (e.g. a paper handout or downloadable document) will be made available on Learning Central at least 24 hours before the session.

Still images or diagrams will be used in this module as an occasional supplement to illustrate points which are also presented verbally (e.g. in text or by means of a caption).

Sound, video and other multi-media resources are not used in this module.

Students will practise and develop the following skills:

• the ability to describe several main theories about metaethical questions
• the ability to critically assess the main strengths and weaknesses of these theories 
• the ability to extract material relevant to a particular problem from a body of literature
• the ability to evaluate chains of complex reasoning
• the ability to classify philosophical arguments as valid or invalid, convincing or unconvincing the ability to work independently

Transferable / Employability Skills:

It is worth bearing in mind that, even though the point of the module is to do philosophy, many of the skills you’ll be developing are also highly valued by graduate employers. These include:

• Critical Thinking: e.g. the ability to understand, structure and critically evaluate the key points and arguments made in written texts and discussions––achieved through e.g. reading, small group activities in lectures and seminars, plenary discussions in seminars, reflecting on lecture materials, essay and exam preparation and writing.
• Communication: the ability to formulate and articulate your critical thinking, both orally and on paper, in ways that others can grasp and engage with––achieved through e.g. small group work in seminars, seminar discussions, essay/exam writing.
• Organisation: the ability to organise and coordinate workloads––achieved through balancing e.g. reading, seminar preparation, essay/exam preparation.
• Working with others: e.g. co-constructing ideas, responding sensitively to others––achieved through e.g. small group work in seminars, group presentations.

The module will be assessed by a take-home assessment and one essay of 2,000 words.

This module is assessed according to the Marking Criteria set out in the Philosophy Course Guide. There are otherwise no academic or competence standards which limit the availability of adjustments or alternative assessments for students with disabilities.

Doctrines and arguments of current analytical philosophers on the metaethical topics of:

• moral realism and anti-realism
• moral subjectivism and objectivism
• emotivism and expressivism
• response dependence: constructivism and sensibility
• moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism
• naturalism and non-naturalism
• error theory and fictionalism
• moral epistemology

Indicative schedule of topics, by semester week:

1. Introduction
2. Non-naturalism
3. Moore’s open question argument
4. Subjectivism
5. Constructivism
6. Reading week
7. Response dependence
8. Emotivism
9. Expressivism
10. Error theory
11. Naturalism

Indicative

Moore, G. E. ‘The open question argument: the subject-matter of ethics’. Principia Ethica 1903 Chapter 1. Cambridge UP. In S&C

Foot, P. ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, Philosophical Review 81 (1972), 305-316.In S&C

 Williams, B. ‘Internal and External Reasons’ In Rational Action. Ed. Harrison, R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in — Williams, B.  Moral Luck. In S&C

Shafer-Landau, R. ‘Moral Reasons’, in Moral Realism: A Defence, ch. 7-8 In S&C

Milo, R. ‘Contractarian Constructivism’. Journal of Philosophy 1995 pps 181-204. In S&C

Reading week.

Wiggins, D. 'A Sensible Subjectivism?' Needs, Values, Truth 2^nd Ed. 1991. Pps 185-211. In S&C

Ayer, A. H. ‘A Critique of Ethics and Theology’ Language, Truth and Logic 1952. Pps 102-14. Dover.  In S&C.

Blackburn, S. ‘How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist’. Essays in Quasi-Realism. 1993. Pps 166-81. Oxford UP.  In S&C

Joyce, R. ‘The myth of morality’. The myth of morality. 2002. Cambridge UP. pps. 1-5, 8, 42-4, 49, 51, 80-85, 88-91. In S&C.

Boyd, R. ‘How to Be a Moral Realist’. McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism.  1988 pps 182-7, 196-217. Cornell UP. In S&C.

You are advised not to purchase books until seeing the full module reading list. I have chosen two anthologies on metaethics from which the overwhelming majority of the readings come and which contain the readings required for the seminars. I have also listed two introductory books that are worth reading chapters from. Further guidance will be given in the lectures. Indicative.

Module Anthologies

Fisher, A. & Kirchin, S. 2006. Arguing About Metaethics.  London: Routledge.  

Shafer-Landau, R. & Cuneo, T.  2007. Foundations of Ethics : An Anthology.  Oxford: Blackwell.  Introductory books

Fisher, A. 2011. Metaethics, an Introduction. Acumen. This gives brief descriptions of most positions.

Van Roojen, M. S. 2015. Metaethics : A Contemporary Introduction.  Abingdon: Routledge. The relevant chapters in this are worth reading when we are covering a topics.

Miller, A. 2003. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics.  Cambridge: Blackwell. Not an easy read but often has thorough discussion of some of the harder arguments in various areas, so can be quite good to consult in that respect.

Moore, G. E. ‘The open question argument: the subject-matter of ethics’. Principia Ethica 1903 Chapter 1. Cambridge UP. In S&C

Foot, P. ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, Philosophical Review 81 (1972), 305-316.In S&C

 Williams, B. ‘Internal and External Reasons’ In Rational Action. Ed. Harrison, R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in — Williams, B.  Moral Luck. In S&C

Shafer-Landau, R. ‘Moral Reasons’, in Moral Realism: A Defence, ch. 7-8 In S&C

Milo, R. ‘Contractarian Constructivism’. Journal of Philosophy 1995 pps 181-204. In S&C

Reading week.

Wiggins, D. 'A Sensible Subjectivism?' Needs, Values, Truth 2^nd Ed. 1991. Pps 185-211. In S&C

Ayer, A. H. ‘A Critique of Ethics and Theology’ Language, Truth and Logic 1952. Pps 102-14. Dover.  In S&C.

Blackburn, S. ‘How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist’. Essays in Quasi-Realism. 1993. Pps 166-81. Oxford UP.  In S&C

Joyce, R. ‘The myth of morality’. The myth of morality. 2002. Cambridge UP. pps. 1-5, 8, 42-4, 49, 51, 80-85, 88-91. In S&C.

Boyd, R. ‘How to Be a Moral Realist’. McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism.  1988 pps 182-7, 196-217. Cornell UP. In S&C.

A full module reading list will be made available to students at the beginning of the semester.